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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, exchange rate crises in Western Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and 
Russia have confirmed again the need for appropriate policies to handle international  capital 
flows. Such crises were not new. However, increasing integration of financial markets has 
increased the cost of poor policy design. This general conclusion applies a fortiori to the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe for whom the benefits of rapid and 
reliable accession to the EU are large. Any crisis that threatens this process is particularly 
costly. Transition economies have already experienced substantial capital flows. The likely 
course of future events will further to increase their importance. 
The Nice Summit confirmed the EU commitment to eastward enlargement. In the pre-
accession stage, accession countries will implement the reforms and adopt the policies 
necessary to comply with the Copenhagen criteria: a functioning market economy, the ability 
to compete within the EU, and espousal of the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union. Both accession countries and the EU envisage that full capital mobility will prevail by 
the time of accession. Many European transition economies have already liberalized capital 
account transactions substantially. The remaining vestiges of capital controls will also have to 
go. This can only increase exposure to capital flows.   
The second stage lies between accession and membership of monetary union. New EU 
members will have to view their economic policies, including exchange rate policies, as a 
matter of common concern to all EU members. At some point during this second stage, the 
new members will join ERM-2, the exchange rate arrangement between the Euro and EU 
members outside the Euro. During this second stage, new members will pursue the 
convergence criteria necessary to adopt the Euro. The process of accession therefore entails 
increasingly pegged exchange rates without any support from capital account controls. 
The third stage is adoption of the Euro and full membership of monetary union. At this 
point, many of the problems posed by volatile capital flows recede: there is no ‘fixed but 
adjustable’ exchange rate to attack. For example, within the United States, interstate mobility 
of capital is one of the adjustment mechanisms that compensate for the inability to adjust 
exchange rates between individual states when state-specific shocks occur.  
European transition economies have already experienced capital flows to varying degrees. 
How this was linked to the other macroeconomic policies pursued is one of the principal 
questions I try to resolve. A better understanding of these issues is important because 
accession countries face a dangerously exposed period before the relative security of 
monetary union will be available. During this interim period, they will be committed to full 
capital mobility yet face considerable constraints on the macroeconomic policies they are 
allowed to follow. In particular, there is the prospect of substantial capital inflows as 
international investors make the ‘convergence play’ in asset markets. Such inflows carry the 
double danger of initial domestic overheating and a subsequent painful outflow if confidence 
falters.   
My paper is therefore in four parts. First, I examine why capital flows arise, the problems 
they create, and the policies available to enjoy the benefits of capital mobility while 
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mitigating the costs. Second, I assess how existing EU members negotiated the critical interim 
period on the way to monetary union and ask what lessons can be drawn. Third, I consider 
what lessons can already be drawn from the experience of European transition economies to 
date. Finally, I evaluate the policy options facing these countries as they continue along the 
path to full membership not just of the EU and but of EMU itself. 
2. CAPITAL FLOWS IN THEORY 
2.1. Causes of capital flows 
Capital inflows have many causes, some of which may be external. Here, however, I am 
interested mainly in domestic explanations of capital inflows. I distinguish four reasons why 
capital inflows occur. First, if middle-income countries have scope to grow more quickly than 
rich countries, middle-income countries offer the prospect of higher returns on physical 
investment while they catch up. Since middle-income countries have limited scope for 
domestic saving, access to foreign capital allows profitable investment to be undertaken. This 
flow of capital may be largest at the time of initial achievement of confidence in legal 
infrastructure, political stability, the ability to precommit to allow future repatriation of profit 
and capital abroad, and trade liberalization.   
Second, capital inflows may reflect structural distortions in domestic capital markets and 
easier access to global markets. When global access is increased as an act of policy, domestic 
residents exploit the comparative advantage that foreign capital markets enjoy. 
Third, the demand for domestic money increases as inflation expectations fall. The 
corresponding extra domestic money supply can be accomplished either through domestic 
open market operations or by the finance of budget deficits. If neither mechanism operates on 
sufficient scale, an inflow of foreign exchange reserves accomplishes the same outcome. The 
central bank finds itself issuing domestic debt to finance its purchase of this reserve inflow, 
and the monetary theory of the balance of payments explains the endogenous open market 
operation required to maintain money supply in line with higher money demand. This is 
simply a Krugman (1979) balance of payments ‘crisis’ in reverse.  
Fourth, many countries undertaking successful disinflation with relatively independent 
central banks find that domestic real interest rates are high precisely at the time that their 
equilibrium real exchange rate is expected to appreciate. Halpern and Wyplosz (1999) 
document the tendency for Balassa-Samuelson effects to promote real appreciation in 
transition economies unless rapid foreign debt accumulation creates a need for greater 
competitiveness to service debt interest. Countries that offer high real interest rates and the 
prospect of steady real appreciation are likely to attract substantial portfolio and short term 
capital inflows.  
Channels for inflows are potential channels for outflows. The same four channels operate. 
First, a loss of confidence, either in continuing structural reforms to sustain growth or in the 
commitment to political stability and smooth repatriation of foreign capital, will trigger a 
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reversal of ‘longer-term’ investment. Since confidence can quickly change and existing 
capital stakes can be resold to domestic residents, little capital is truly long term. 
Second, successful development of domestic capital markets may eventually mitigate the 
need to rely to heavily on foreign capital. Permanent reliance on foreign capital remains 
relatively rare. Economists have spent three decades trying to explain the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle for developed economies: national saving and national investment are much more 
highly correlated than perfect global capital mobility would imply.  
Third, any resurgence in expected inflation will reduce the demand for domestic money, 
requiring some mechanism for altering domestic supply. If this is not accomplished by 
domestic policy, capital flows on the balance of payments will act as open market operation 
of last resort – the classic balance of payments crisis first described in Krugman (1979). 
Fourth, lower expectations of either the trend rate of structural adjustment and real 
appreciation or of the path of real interest rates will make assets in that currency less attractive 
to global investors, prompting a capital outflow. 
These are four channels through which an economy’s fundamentals alter the incentive to 
allocate global capital. However, capital flows sometimes respond to bubbles unrelated to 
fundamentals. Investor sentiment may also exhibit contagion, in which views about one 
country are then projected onto ‘similar’ countries, whether or not these share all the 
characteristics of the country about which investors initially revised their opinion. 
Endogeneity of policy also creates the potential for multiple equilibrium, and hence successful 
self-fulfilling ‘attacks’. Although Obstfeld (1996) first examined these in relation to 
devaluation, in principle similar considerations could apply to inflows and sharp upward 
revaluations of the exchange rate. 
Large capital flows would of course be unlikely if capital mobility was low or capital 
movements outlawed. The increasing prevalence of large capital flows in the last two decades 
reflects financial liberalization and increasing financial market integration. In terms of the size 
and potential reversibility of capital inflows, this suggests that channels three and four - those 
associated with money demand and short term capital flows – will be the most significant. In 
turn, these highlight the role of fiscal and monetary policy, including the choice of exchange 
rate regime.  
2.2. Capital Inflows: Benefits, Problems, and Policy Responses 
The appropriate response depends on the diagnosis of the reason why the capital inflow 
occurs. Suppose first that capital inflows reflect opportunities for profitable long-term 
investment, combined with inadequate domestic saving (channel 1) or initial distortions in 
domestic capital markets (channel 2). 
Accession countries are investing in economic transition, with large early costs then 
benefits extending well into the future.  The first-best response is to borrow the entire amount 
abroad and long term, and plan eventually to run a trade surplus to service the debt.  However, 
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moral hazard and adverse selection impede this solution. Countries are unable to borrow 
nearly as much as they would like. Even if they can, multiple lenders confer externalities on 
one another, setting up individual incentives to panic at the first sign of crisis when 
collectively it would be better for lenders not to call in their loans The Mexican crisis is an 
obvious example.  Sachs, Tornell & Velasco (1996) discuss the extent to which the Mexican 
crisis reflected a self-fulfilling run. For a comprehensive analysis of such problems and their 
possible solutions, see Eichengreen and Portes (1995).  
But for this problem, a capital inflow would ease a country’s external constraint. It allows 
additional spending on investment and consumption: investment because the rate of return on 
new capital is high; consumption because it is the early generation that bears an undue share 
of the costs of transition and because maintaining political support for economic progress is a 
constraint. When a transition economy is close to full capacity, it may be optimal to spend 
most of the inflow immediately.  
When a capital account surplus induces a current account deficit of comparable size, the   
domestic money stock is unaltered; and there is little overheating of the domestic economy 
since extra demand for consumption and investment is matched by extra import supply. 
Generally, however, additional borrowing is spent both on traded and nontraded goods: the 
first-round effect is therefore to induce a current account deficit smaller than the capital 
inflow, and hence to provide a net reserve inflow. The market mechanism that ensures the 
current account deficit matches the capital account inflow is a real appreciation of the 
exchange rate, which switches the additional domestic spending to traded goods. Nor need 
this threaten solvency in the long run. If inflows are spent on capacity-enhancing investment 
(including human investment), it may be possible preserve competitiveness at a higher real 
exchange rate (Balassa-Samuelson again). If so, it is wrong to complain about the size of the 
current account deficit. 
However, this presupposes that inflows are long term, not subject to future reversal. In 
practice, moral hazard and adverse selection limit such commitments. Moreover, financing 
illiquid investment by borrowing short is risky business, especially if this entails a currency 
mismatch. Practical policy design must be more cautious. 
A wise approach will entail taking prudential supervision of banks seriously, including 
early limits to excessive exposure. Such microeconomic responses are dealt with in other 
papers in this conference, and are not the principal focus of the macroeconomic analysis of 
my paper. I focus instead on the remaining two channels of capital flows, associated with 
variations in money demand and in the perceived short-term return on other financial assets.  
Another element of a safety-first policy may be to prefer greater exchange rate flexibility: if 
capital account inflows cannot exceed current account outflows, this limits the size of the 
inflow, and what has not flowed in cannot subsequently flow out. Nevertheless, this argument 
should not be overstated: by 1999 Poland had a current account deficit of 8% of GDP despite 
adopting greater exchange rate flexibility. 
I turn now to channel 3. Where monetary inflows reflect an increase in demand for 
domestic money, the money supply can be correspondingly increased without raising 
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expected spending and without putting upward pressure on prices. This is simple in theory but 
in practice is complicated by two considerations. First, it is always difficult quickly to 
diagnose the reason for capital inflows. Monetary accommodation of inflows that are 
unconnected with increases in money demand will be inflationary. Second, if fickle short-
term investors subsequently revise their opinions and withdraw their capital, a rapid reduction 
in the money stock may be much more costly than the earlier rapid increase. Banks may use 
additional deposits to finance less liquid lending, leaving them vulnerable to rapid 
contraction. 
Hence, many governments try to take out insurance by using sterilized intervention as the 
first line of defense. The central bank issues domestic liabilities with which to finance the 
acquisition of the reserve inflows that accompany a balance of payments surplus when the 
government is reluctant to allow an exchange rate appreciation (in case the inflow is not to 
augment potential output) but simultaneously reluctant to allow an increase in the money 
stock (in case the inflow is not the result of an increase in money demand). 
Do we expect sterilized intervention to work? The more mobile is international money the 
harder it will be to choose independently the money supply and the exchange rate. However,  
even  with mobile capital, such intervention may have a very short-term effect if it is thought 
to signal future changes in monetary policy. 
In accession countries, capital mobility has risen but from a low base. Its current level 
varies from country to country and is often subject to dispute. Comparing onshore and 
offshore financial markets during the Asian crisis, Begg and Wyplosz (2001) conclude that 
capital mobility was pretty perfect in relation to the Czech Koruna but less so in relation to the 
Hungarian Forint. However, given that accession countries are intent on joining the EU and 
are acceding to demand that capital controls be completely dismantled, it seems unwise to 
base policy advice on any significant role for sterilized intervention. 
In such circumstances, the main effect of trying to sterilize capital inflows is to frustrate the 
adjustment in interest rates that would eventually have choked off the inflow. Even if the 
government wishes to manage the exchange rate and prevent a large appreciation, unsterilized 
intervention is then more appropriate. By allowing the reserve inflow to augment the money 
supply, the policy reduces interest rates and makes financial inflows less attractive.  
This prescription also reduces the significance of the distinction between fixed and floating 
exchange rate regimes. Under floating, capital inflows cause a nominal appreciation that 
reduces competitiveness, under pegged exchange rates, deciding not to sterilize reserve 
inflows will allow a monetary expansion, inflation, and a similar loss of competitiveness 
unless higher money demand was the sole cause of the original inflow. 
Similarly, where the policy mix entails high real interest rates plus an appreciating real 
exchange rate, capital inflows are likely whatever the exchange rate regime. The decision to 
fix or float may affect the scale of the inflow but is not itself a means of preventing it. 
Where the government is reluctant to conclude that inflows reflect higher money demand 
but equally reluctant to allow the exchange rate to appreciate, the only reliable fallback 
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position is a tightening of fiscal policy. By reducing aggregate demand, this reduces money 
demand and allows a fall in domestic interest rates for a given money supply. Sustainably 
lower interest rates reduce the incentive for global capital to pile into the currency. Preventing 
tidal waves of speculative, and therefore reversible, inflows is an important component of a 
sound strategy to diminish vulnerability to sudden and damaging outflows. 
3. EVIDENCE FROM EXISTING EMU MEMBERS 
To find out how useful the theory is in practice I examine how some existing EMU countries 
fared in recent years. This raises the questions of which countries to examine, and over what 
period. I look not at the inner core but at the periphery, countries that were later entrants to the 
EU, slower to disinflate, or both. I examine Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Ireland. 
Over what period should they be studied? Is it the credibility of monetary policy that 
matters, the prospect of fiscal discipline, or access to the EU itself. To avoid prejudging the 
case, I examine evidence from 1986 onwards. 
For EC founder members (such as Italy) and early entrants (such as Ireland, 1973), 1986 
marks both the signing of the Single European Act and the start of the New EMS in which 
exchange rate discipline became tighter. For these countries it is impossible to distinguish the 
effects of the Single European Act and the New EMS. However, Spain and Portugal joined 
the EU in 1986 but did not join the EMS until later (Spain, 1989; Portugal, 1992). Greece 
joined the EU in 1981, but its slow progress in macroeconomic convergence meant that it did 
not join the ERM until 1998. All 5 countries are now members of EMU, Greece having joined 
in 2001, the others at the outset in 1999. 
Box 1      
Transition economies already faced large capital inflows 
In May 1997, a speculative attack forced the Czech Republic to abandon the exchange rate 
peg it had maintained since 1991. In 1995-97, the current account deficit spiraled, despite a 
government budget close to balance. The table below shows the escalating current account 
deficit, falling competitiveness, and scale of capital inflows. 
 It also shows huge sterilization. The central bank issued domestic debt and bought foreign 
reserves to try to prevent large inflows spilling into the domestic money supply.  Begg (1997) 
argues that the policy failed: by preventing inflows from reducing domestic interest rates it 
merely stimulated further inflows. Nor did it avert the final crisis. 
Credit had been liberalized and private demand was increasing rapidly. Even budget balance 
was insufficiently tight: when the private sector runs a large deficit, only a substantial public 
sector surplus will prevent a dangerously large current account deficit. Further tightening of 
fiscal policy during the crisis helped soften the subsequent landing.    
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Czech Economic indicators  (end year) 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Inflation (%) 18 10 8 9 
Real effective exchange rate (1992=100) 118 122  125 133 
Balance of payments (% of GDP)    10 10 15 1 
of which  current account  2 0 3 8 
  capital account 8 12 17 7  
Central bankAssets (bn Crowns) 
 Net foreign assets 
 Net domestic assets 
17
99
83
29
 
180 
33 
 
364 
170 
Liabilities (bn Crowns) 
 Narrow monetary base 116 112
 
147 
 
194  
Source: Begg (1997) 
 
3.1. When did the Big Inflows Occur in the EU? 
Begg et al (2001) argue that, during 1986-99, the largest inflows generally occurred in the 
mid-to-late 1980s, with a smaller wave in the mid-to-late 1990s. Table 1 provides data. Peak 
years of capital inflow typically coincided with substantial balance of payments surpluses and 
reserve inflows. 
The data of Table 1 contradict the conventional wisdom. First, the run up to EMU was not 
the only, and in some countries not the main, phase of capital inflows. Substantial inflows 
also occurred in the late 1980s when the combination greater exchange rate stability (within 
the narrow ERM) offered the initial ‘convergence play’ on interest rates, and the certain 
prospect of the Single Market made longer-term investment attractive. Moreover, these large 
inflows took place despite the fact that capital controls remained in place until 1990-92. 
Second, the convergence play on Italian interest rates in the run up to EMU – made famous by the 
exploits of LTCM – failed to induce a net capital inflow to Italy. The Italian financial (capital) account 
records a net outflow in every year during 1994-99. The substantial portfolio inflows in 1995-96 were 
more than offset by other outflows of short-term capital and net FDI. In the late 1990s Italy never 
faced the consequences of a capital and monetary inflow. In the late 1980s it did, albeit on a smaller 
scale than other countries in this group. 
Third, the same conclusion applies to Ireland, whose performance in the 1990s benefited from 
substantial inflows of FDI (Table 1 shows FDI inflows were positive every year during 1987-99 and 
accelerated sharply in the late 1990s) but offset by outflows of portfolio and other investment. 1998 is 
the only year Ireland experienced a net inflow on the financial account (exclusive of capital transfers 
and errors and omissions). When capital transfers and errors and omissions are allocated to the capital 
account as in Table 1, estimates of capital inflows (as a percent of GDP) are only a small fraction of 
the balance of payments surpluses. To the extent Ireland experienced reserve inflows in the late 1990s 
these arose principally as a result of current account surpluses not capital inflows. Reserve inflows 
were the consequence of past economic success not the precursor of future success. In contrast, and as 
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in the other four countries, capital inflows in the late 1980s were more than sufficient to account for 
the entire balance of payments surplus. 
The other three countries conform more closely to the standard picture of reserve inflows 
driven by the capital account. Greece faced sustained capital inflows, for every year during 
1986-98 with the sole exception of 1997, and had current account deficits in every single year 
of the period. For much of the period it also experienced substantial payments surpluses. 
Spain and Portugal fit closely the most straightforward application of the theory – two periods of 
dramatic payments surpluses generated by large capital inflows. 
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86 
3.9 
-1.6 
3.1 
2.2
2.3 
0.9
-0.7
1.6
89.1
2.4 
1.9
0.5
-4.1
7.1
87 
-0.3 
14.2 
3.8 
3.8
12.7 
4.4
4.5
0.0
90.0
2.7 
3.6
-0.9
-2.9
11.8
88 
-3.8 
14.6 
5.8 
2.3
6.5
8.4 
2.2
3.2
-1.0
96.3
3.2 
4.5
-1.3
-3.4
7.4
89 
-10.9 
18.3 
7.0 
8.0
3.3
4.7 
1.2
3.9
-2.7
103.7
3.8 
4.9
-1.1
-4.2
7.9
90 
-18.0 
23.0 
10.4 
9.0
3.6
7.2 
1.4
4.9
-3.5
114.6
4.5 
5.3
-0.8
-5.1
6.7
91 
-19.8 
32.0 
8.0 
20.0
4.0
14.3 
2.6
6.2
-3.6
117.5
5.6 
6.7
-1.1
-5.0
4.0
92 
-21.5 
6.0 
11.1 
9.3
-14.4
-17.9 
-3.0
0.6
-3.6
120.3
6.0 
5.5
0.5
-3.7
3.8
93 
-5.8 
-0.4 
6.5 
47.7
-54.6
-5.2 
-1.0
0.2
-1.2
107.6
6.5 
6.4
0.1
-4.7
4.4
94 
-6.3 
4.5 
5.2 
19.4
-20.1
0.0 
0.0
1.3
-1.3
101.2
7.2 
7.1
0.1
-3.9
-1.4
95 
0.8 
-8.0 
4.1 
21.1
-33.2
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0.0
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4.9
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15.8
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-1.7 
2.4 
0.4
0.0
2.0
0.7 
1.5
5.1
-3.6 
90.1
1.0 
0.3
0.7
-10.1
13.9 
87 
-1.3 
2.0 
0.4
0.0
1.6
1.0 
1.8
4.1
-2.3 
86.0
1.3 
-0.5
1.8
-8.6
15.0 
88 
-1.0 
1.9 
0.7
0.0
1.2
1.0 
1.5
3.1
-1.7 
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1.9
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86 
-0.9 
1.8 
0.0 
1.8 
0.0 
-0.1 
-0.3 
2.8 
-3.1 
162.8 
1.1 
2.3 
-1.2 
-7.3 
7.9 
87 
-0.1 
0.6 
0.1 
-0.2 
0.7 
0.9 
2.3 
2.5 
-0.2 
149.4 
1.2 
2.9 
-1.7 
-5.9 
6.8 
88 
0.0 
0.2 
0.1 
1.0 
-0.9 
0.6 
1.5 
1.5 
0.0 
137.2 
1.3 
3.2 
-1.9 
-2.8 
3.7 
89 
-0.6 
-1.6 
0.1 
0.6 
-2.3 
-0.9 
-2.3 
-0.8 
-1.5 
126.1 
1.5 
2.6 
-1.1 
-1.4 
2.9 
90 
-0.4 
-2.0 
0.3 
-0.2 
-2.1 
0.6 
1.2 
2.0 
-0.8 
131.4 
1.6 
3.0 
-1.4 
-3.9 
2.8 
91 
0.3 
-2.0 
1.2 
-1.1 
-2.1 
0.5 
1.0 
0.4 
0.7 
126.3 
1.6 
3.3 
-1.7 
-2.7 
1.2 
92 
0.6 
-4.0 
1.2 
-2.3 
-2.9 
-2.2 
-4.4 
-5.6 
1.0 
122.1 
1.6 
1.5 
0.1 
-2.0 
4.8 
93 
1.8 
-0.9 
0.9 
2.5 
-4.3 
2.7 
5.6 
1.9 
3.7 
112.9 
1.8 
4.3 
-2.5 
-0.8 
1.8 
94 
1.6 
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-1.4 
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-3.2 
2.7 
108.8 
1.9 
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0.1 
-3.5 
95 
1.7 
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-0.3 
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2.3 
3.5 
0.9 
2.6 
100.0 
2.1 
5.5 
-3.4 
-1.0 
1.7 
96 
2.0 
-2.8 
1.9 
0.8 
-5.5 
-0.1 
-0.1 
-2.9 
2.8 
99.1 
2.3 
5.0 
-2.7 
0.9 
2.1 
97 
1.9 
-7.5 
1.7 
-3.2 
-6.0 
-1.1 
-1.4 
-3.8 
2.4 
91.7 
2.6 
4.6 
-2.0 
0.8 
2.8 
98 
2.1 
4.3 
5.7 
-12.0 
10.6 
3.0 
3.9 
1.2 
2.7 
85.9 
3.0 
6.4 
-3.4 
1.8 
1.9 
99 
0.3 
-3.0 
13.0 
-15.3 
-0.2 
-3.1 
-3.1 
-3.4 
0.7 
81.7 
 
 
 
1.9 
0 
Source:  Begg et al (2001) 
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otes: D
ata on capital transfers and on errors and om
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n, but affect estim
ates of capital flow
s/G
D
P, w
hich m
ay be constructed 
either by dividing the financial account total by G
D
P, or (as in the table) by subtracting the current account from
 the overall B of P and 
then dividing by G
D
P. The form
er m
ethod allocates capital transfers and errors and om
issions to the current account, the latter to the 
capital account. Som
e com
prom
ise allocation is also possible.   
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3.2. Did Competitiveness Decline in Periods of Reserve Inflows? 
Italy 1987-90 With no ERM realignment during 1987-90, Italian inflation above that in the 
inner core led to a steady loss of competitiveness, even allowing for productivity growth   
during the period. Italian relative unit labor costs grew in total by 9% during 1987-90. 
Portugal 1987-91 With much larger reserve inflows during the same period, Portuguese 
relative unit labor costs grew much more than in Italy, by 28% during the period.  
Portugal 1996-98  Despite another period of substantial inflows, relative unit labor costs 
grew in total by a mere 1%, despite now being a full ERM member. We therefore need to 
explain this difference in the evolution of competitiveness across the different episodes. 
Spain 1987-91  Spanish relative unit labor costs grew by 31% during the period. 
Spain 1996-97  Despite substantial inflows, relative unit labor costs actually fell. Even if we 
examine subsequent data because of the shortness of the period and the possibility of delayed 
adjustment, by 1999 relative unit labor costs were only 3% higher than 1996. As with 
Portugal, Spain behaved differently in the two episodes.  
Greece 1986-90   During the initial phase of capital inflows, when Greece recorded modest 
payments surpluses, relative unit labor costs increased. 
3.3. Did Sterilization Policy Explain Differences in Short-Run Outcomes Identified 
Above?  
How did sterilization policy evolved during 1986-1999? As capital controls were gradually 
dismantled, one would expect a priori that resort to sterilization would gradually diminish as 
its effectiveness fell. 
Italy During the inflow period 1987-90, Table 1 shows that central bank liabilities 
(currency) increased by 19.2 trillion lira. On the asset side, net foreign assets rose by 32 
trillion lira and net domestic assets fell by 12.8 trillion lira. On average the bank was 
stockpiling foreign reserves at about 8 trillion lira a year, just under 1% of annual GDP during 
the period. Since Table 2 shows an average balance of payments surplus of 1% during this 
period, this amounts to a policy of substantial sterilization of inflows. This did not prevent a 
loss of competitiveness. 
1990 was the peak year of the ratio of net foreign assets to domestic currency. During 
1990-99 currency subsequently increased but central bank net foreign assets fell. Although 
there were particular years (1998) in which sterilization occurred, in general the policy was 
abandoned. 
Portugal   During 1987-91 the average balance of payments surplus was 5% of GDP. Over 
the same period, central bank liabilities (currency) increased by 0.2 trillion escudos, whereas 
net foreign assets rose by 2.6 trillion. Thus, 0.5 trillion escudos a year of reserve assets were 
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stockpiled. Nominal GDP rose from 5 to 11 trillion escudos. Taking the central value of 8 
trillion, an annual payments surplus of 5% of GDP is 0.4 trillion escudos. In short, the central 
bank was more than fully sterilizing the entire inflow. We saw that the cumulative increase in 
relative unit labor costs was nevertheless 28%. Massive and sustained sterilization did not 
prevent this deterioration in competitiveness. 
Like Italy, Portugal abandoned sterilization in the 1990s? Table 1 shows little change in the 
composition of the central bank balance sheet after 1991. The share of net foreign assets 
actually falls a little. 
Spain Despite balance of payments surpluses during 1987-91, Spain engaged in less 
sterilization that Italy or Portugal. Nor has Spain made any significant use of sterilization 
subsequently. 
Greece   The Greek central bank steadily reduced net foreign assets during 1986-94, 
despite steadily increasing the supply of domestic currency. The counterpart was a rapid rise 
in its holding of net domestic assets, perhaps because it remained responsible for government 
financing during a period when budget deficits were substantial. However, with increasing 
fiscal prudence and greater central bank independence, Table 1 shows that during 1995-98 net 
foreign assets increased at roughly twice the rate of domestic currency creation. 
Ireland   Table 1 also shows that sterilization policy was used vigorously in Ireland, and 
not merely in the 1980s. During 1986-88 Irish currency increases by 0.2 trillion punts, while 
net foreign assets of the central bank increase 0.9 trillion, more than sufficient to offset the 
cumulative balance of payments surplus during the period. The subsequent isolated years of 
large payments surpluses (1993, 1995, 1998) coincide with sharp increases in central bank net 
foreign assets. 
Thus it is difficult to discern any general trend. In particular, there is no obvious correlation 
between variations in sterilization policy and movements in competitiveness. To explain these 
variations, we need our remaining candidate for an explanation, variations in fiscal policy.  
3.4. Tightening Fiscal Policy Offers a Way out of the Dilemma 
If governments don’t think inflows reflect permanently higher demand for assets denominated 
in domestic currency, nor believe inflows are a prelude to greater competitiveness that would 
allow the economy to live with exchange rate appreciation, the ‘third way’ is to tighten fiscal 
policy. This changes the monetary-fiscal mix, and allows a reduction in interest rates without 
boosting aggregate demand. Lower interest rates reduce the incentive for capital inflows.  
Analyzing episodes of capital inflows in Table 1, Begg et al (2001) show that there is a 
strong negative correlation between fiscal tightening and real appreciation during periods of 
capital inflows. Remaining discrepancies are largely explained once one controls for the scale 
of the initial inflows. Table 2 illustrates and provides powerful confirmation that a readiness 
to tighten fiscal policy if required is a good defense against ‘excessive’ capital inflows. 
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Table 2    
Competitiveness, payments surpluses and fiscal policy 
Mean annual ∆ 
RULC 
  
Mean annual ∆ in 
structural budget deficit  
as % of GDP 
Mean annual surplus 
in  BoP as % of GDP 
Episode 
-12.8 - 2.3 1.9 Ireland, 1987-88 
- 0.6  - 1.7 1.4 Greece, 1993-94 
- 0.4 - 1.2 2.3 Greece, 1998-99 
- 0.2 - 0.5 0.7 Portugal, 1996-98 
 0.1    0.6 1.1 Ireland, 1990-91 
 0.7  - 0.2  0.7 Italy, 1994-97 
 0.9  - 1.6 3.4 Spain, 1996-97 
 1.2    0.6 1.6 Greece, 1986-88 
 1.6 - 3.6 5.0 Greece, 1993-94 
 2.2    0.3 1.0 Italy, 1987-90 
 5.6    na 5.0 Portugal, 1987-91 
 6.2    0.2 2.4 Spain, 1987-91 
Source: Table 1 
 
In this section I have examined earlier outcomes of those EMU members whose 
convergence experience is most relevant to countries of Central and Eastern Europe currently 
seeking accession to the EU and then to EMU. This earlier experience has been instructive. 
Some of the surge of capital inflows may occur when credibility is first established, rather 
than in the immediate run up to the adoption of the Euro; and may occur even before the full 
liberalization of capital movements takes place.  
There is little evidence that sterilization is effective. It may even be counterproductive. 
Concerns about an appreciating real exchange rate are better met by tightening fiscal policy. 
Table 1 sheds less light on the narrow choice of exchange rate regime. During the period 
under study, by and large these countries of Western Europe were either EMS members or 
prospective EMS members with heavily managed floats. There is a theoretical presumption 
that floating exchange rate regimes experience smaller capital flows. The data of Table 1, 
although consistent with this contention, provide little direct evidence to back this up. 
Having examined the experience of Western Europe I turn now to the experience to date in 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Not only is this of interest in its own right, the 
greater diversity of monetary and exchange rate regimes provides interesting evidence about 
the relationship between regime choice and the extent of capital flows.  
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4. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE CHOICE OF 
EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
4.1. A Brief History of Exchange Rate Regimes in Accession Countries   
For the CEE(10), the ten countries of central and eastern Europe for which data is readily 
available, Table 3 documents the diversity of exchange rate regime, both across countries and 
over time within countries. Generally, the latter has been in the direction of greater exchange 
rate flexibility. As domestic fundamentals got stronger, enhanced macroeconomic credibility 
and more robust microeconomic institutions, there was less need to use the exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor. Moreover, as capital mobility increased, additional exchange rate flexibility 
offered some protection against large but volatile capital flows. Higher capital mobility made 
it harder and harder to defend the middle ground of partially fixed exchange rates. Only where 
domestic credibility broke down completely, as in Bulgaria, did the advantages of additional 
exchange rate fixity outweigh the costs of dispensing with the exchange rate as a shock 
absorber. 
Table 3  
Evolving exchange rate regimes in the CEE(10) 
              Fixed                             Limited flexibility                                 Flexible 
 Currency    Fixed                     Narrow band or                           Broad       
Relatively               
  Board          peg                       tightly managed                            band         
free float 
Bulgaria  
Czech 
Republic 
Estonia       X 
Hungary 
Latvia                          X 
Lithuania       X 
Poland  
Romania 
Slovakia  
Slovenia                                                                X  
Source:  IMF(2000): ‘Exchange rate regimes in selected advanced transition economies: coping with 
transition, capital inflows and EU accession’, reprinted in European Commission (2000): 
Exchange rate strategies for EU candidate countries,’ ECFIN/521/2000 - EN 
Note: Arrows indicate evolution during the 1990s, X indicates a regime that was maintained 
essentially unchanged 
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4.2. The CEE Experience of Capital Flows to Date 
The EU experience discussed in section 3 suggests CEE countries should already have faced  
capital inflows as their credibility grew and their institutions developed. The trend towards 
greater exchange rate flexibility evident in Table 3 also offers a clue that CEE countries may 
have found greater exposure to capital mobility hard to reconcile with the fixed (but 
adjustable) exchange rate policies with which many of them began. I therefore examine 
directly the data on capital flows and associated macroeconomic performance and policy 
responses.   
Table 4 shows IMF data for the 11 countries of CEE for which macroeconomic and balance 
of payments data is available on a sufficiently comprehensive basis to allow interesting 
comparisons; only Croatian is missing. CA denotes the current account, and FA the financial 
account. The latter comprises FDI, portfolio investment, and other (short term) capital flows. 
Although there is some ambiguity about the allocation of capital transfer payments and errors 
and omissions, I implicitly add these to the capital account. Thus, subtracting the current 
account from the overall balance of payments yields an estimate of the size of capital flows,  
Table 4  
Central and Eastern European experience in the 1990s  
Date CA 
US 
bn $ 
FA 
US 
bn $ 
of which 
FDI Portfolio Other 
BoP 
US 
Bn $ 
BoP/
GDP 
% 
(BoP
- CA)
/ GDP
% 
Short
r 
% 
ER : 
Local
/ US $
GDP
US $
Bn 
CA / 
GDP
% 
real 
eer 
Budget 
/ GDP 
% 
CPI 
∆ P /P 
% 
Monetary authorities 
Balance sheet 
Currency , NFA  ,  NDA 
Bulgaria         mn leva 
1991 -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.0 -0.5 -0.3 -3.0 -2.0 49 0.018 5.6 -1.0 -6.1 339 30 1 29
92 -0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 3.2 7.4 52 0.023 8.7 -4.2 63.6 -5.0 91 45 9 36
93 -1.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 -0.3 -2.8 7.3 48 0.028 10.7 -10.1 97.8 -12.0 73 55 2 53
94 0.0 -1.0 0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -0.2 -2.5 -2.2 66 0.054 9.3 -0.3 89.1 -4.9 96 89 21 68
95 0.0 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4 4.5 4.7 53 0.067 13.4 -0.2 100.0 -5.1 62 154 57 97
96 0.0 -0.7 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 -7.0 -7.2 120 0.178 9.6 0.2 86.0 -19.6 122 351 90 261
97 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 -0.1 1.1 11.6 7.4 66 1.68 10.2 4.2 102.6 2.1 1062 2174 3211 -1037
98 -0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 2 1.76 12.3 -0.5 116.3 2.8 19 2387 3577 -1190
99 -0.7 0.7 0.8 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.8 6.1 3 1.84 12.4 -5.3 118.0 1.5 3 2721 3998 -1277
Czech                           Bn kr 
93 0.5 3.0 0.6 1.6 0.8 3.0 8.4 7.0 12 29.9 33.5 1.4 92.1 0.1 21 166 148 18
94 -0.8 4.5 0.7 0.8 3.0 3.5 9.2 11.3 11 29.1 39.5 -2.1 96.7 0.9 10 223 204 19
94 -1.3 8.2 2.5 1.4 4.3 7.5 15.0 17.6 13 26.6 51.9 -2.6 100.0 0.5 9 343 400 -57
96 -4.3 4.2 1.3 0.7 2.2 -0.8 -1.4 6.0 14 27.3 57.6 -7.4 106.7 -0.1 9 344 366 -22
97 -3.3 1.1 1.2 1.0 -1.1 -1.8 -3.4 2.8 23 34.6 48.2 -6.2 107.5 -1.0 8 345 366 -21
98 -1.4 2.9 2.7 1.1 -0.9 1.9 3.4 5.9 13 30 59.9 -2.5 116.3 -1.6 11 422 402 20
99 -1.1 2.5 4.9 -1.3 -1.1 1.6 2.9 4.9 8 35.9 51.2 -2.0 114.8 -1.6 2 460 490 -30
Estonia                            Bn kr 
93 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 12.8 11.5 13.8 1.6 1.3 -2.3 90 3.8 4.4 -0.6
94 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 6 12.4 2.4 -7.3 1.4 48 4.3 4.6 -0.3
95 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.8 7.2 5 11.5 3.5 -4.4 -0.5 29 5.1 5.5 -0.4
96 -0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 2.4 11.5 4 12.4 4.2 -9.1 -0.8 23 6.2 7.0 -0.8
97 -0.6 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 4.4 16.5 6 14.3 4.5 -12.1 2.5 11 8.5 10.1 -1.6
98 -0.5 0.5 0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 9.2 12 13.4 5.5 -9.2 0.0 8 9.1 10.4 -1.3
99 -0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 2.1 8.3 5 15.5 4.8 -6.2 -0.1 3 11.5 11.6 -0.1
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% 
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% 
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∆ P /P 
% 
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Balance sheet 
Currency, NFA . NDA 
FYRM       bn D                     Mn D 
96 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -2.3 4.7 22 40 4.4 -7  3 8.0 8.3 -0.3
97 -0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -2.7 5.7 21 50 3.7 -8  1 9.9 11.0 -1.1
98 -0.3 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 8.8 21 54 3.5 -8  1 10.4 13.6 -3.2
99 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 2.9 6.0 20 57 3.4 -3  -1 13.5 24.0 -10.5
Hungary                            Bn F 
91 0.4 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.8 5.4 4.2 30 75 33.3 1.2 89.0 -3.8 34 500 237 263
92 0.4 0.4 1.5 0.0 -1.1 0.8 2.1 1.2 35 79 37.2 0.9 96.8 -7.3 23 607 274 333
93 -4.3 6.1 2.4 3.9 -0.2 2.5 6.5 17.5 23 92 38.6 -11.0 105.3 -5.7 23 624 549 75
94 -4.1 3.4 1.1 2.5 -0.2 -0.5 -1.2 8.6 17 105 41.6 -9.8 104.2 -7.1 19 614 635 -21
95 -2.5 7.1 4.5 2.2 0.4 5.4 12.1 17.8 27 125 44.5 -5.7 100.0 -6.4 28 723 1550 -827
96 -1.7 -0.7 2.3 -0.4 -2.6 -1.2 -2.7 1.1 32 153 44.6 -3.8 102.8 -3.1 24 660 1560 -900
97 -1.0 0.7 1.7 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 1.8 24 187 45.2 -2.2 108.1 -4.5 18 858 1590 -732
98 -2.3 3.0 1.6 1.8 -0.4 1.0 2.1 7.0 20 214 47.5 -4.9 107.5 -6.2 14 1033 2008 -975
99 -2.1 4.7 1.7 1.9 1.1 2.3 4.7 9.1 18 237 48.5 -4.3 109.5 -3.7 10 1297 2836 -1539
 
Latvia 
           Mn L 
93 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 13.8 -5.4 35 0.67 2.2 19.2  109 226 240 -14
94 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.7 -2.8 32 0.56 3.6 5.5  36 269 253 16
95 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 22 0.53 4.5 -0.4 -3.9 25 273 227 46
96 -0.3 0.5 0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.2 3.9 9.3 13 0.55 5.1 -5.4 -1.6 18 337 334 3
97 -0.3 0.3 0.5 -0.6 0.4 0.1 1.8 7.9 4 0.58 5.7 -6.1 0.7 8 441 410 31
98 -0.7 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 1.6 12.3 4 0.59 6.1 -10.7 0.1 5 471 424 47
99 -0.6 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 3.2 13.4 5 0.59 6.2 -10.2 -3.8 2 526 503 23
Lithuani
a 
                             Mn L 
93 -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 7.4 10.6 88 4.3 2.7 -3.2 -6.0 410 1257 1324 -67
94 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 2.4 4.6 48 4.0 4.2 -2.2 -4.7 72 1813 1720 93
95 -0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 3.3 13.5 27 4.0 6.0 -10.2 -4.6 40 2446 2337 209
96 -0.7 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 9.2 21 4.0 7.9 -9.2 -3.5 24 2500 2347 153
97 -1.0 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 2.1 12.3 9 4.0 9.6 -10.2 -1.8 9 3308 3175 133
98 -1.3 1.4 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.4 3.7 15.8 11 4.0 10.8 -12.1 -0.5 5 4260 4836 -576
99 -1.2 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -1.9 9.3 11 4.0 10.7 -11.2  1 4088 4072 16
Poland                              Bn Zl 
91 -2.1 -4.2 0.3 0.0 -4.5 -7.0 -9.2 -6.4 50 1.06 76.4 -2.8 80.3  77 10.9 3.3 7.6
92 -3.1 -1.0 0.7 0.0 -1.7 -4.3 -5.1 -1.4 30 1.36 84.6 -3.7 85.4  45 14.9 5.9 9.0
93 -5.8 2.3 1.7 0.0 0.6 -3.2 -3.7 3.0 25 1.81 86.2 -6.7 91.6  37 16.0 7.6 8.4
94 1.0 -9.0 1.9 -0.6 -10.3 1.0 1.0 0.0 23 2.27 99.1 1.0 92.4 -2.1 33 19.6 11.3 8.3
95 0.9 9.3 3.6 1.1 4.6 9.8 7.7 7.0 26 2.42 127.3 0.7 100.0 -1.9 27 28.4 36.5 -8.1
96 -3.2 6.5 4.5 0.3 1.7 3.6 2.5 4.8 21 2.70 143.7 -2.3 108.8 -2.0 20 34.3 51.8 -17.5
97 -5.7 8.0 4.9 2.1 1.0 3.6 2.5 6.5 22 3.28 143.9 -4.0 111.4 -1.3 16 45.9 72.3 -26.4
98 -6.9 13.1 6.0 1.7 5.4 5.7 3.6 7.9 21 3.48 159.2 -4.3 117.7 -1.0 12 53.6 95.6 -42.0
99 -12.5 10.5 7.2 0.2 3.1 2.1 1.4 9.4 14 3.97 155.4 -8.0 112.3 -0.9 7 53.0 106.0 -53.0
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Romania                            Bn  L 
92 -1.5 1.4 0.1 0.0 1.3 -0.1 -0.5 7.2 308 19.6 -7.7 57.6 -4.7 211 859 -70 929
93 -1.2 0.6 0.1 -0.1 0.6 -0.4 -1.5 3.2 760 26.4 -4.7 79.8 -0.5 255 2031 -82 2114
94 -0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.7 2.2 67 1665 29.9 -1.5 85.8 -2.5 137 3809 350 3459
95 -1.8 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.5 -1.4 3.6 41 2033 35.5 -5.0 83.9 -3.0 32 5952 -560 6512
96 -2.6 1.5 0.3 0.2 1.0 -0.6 -1.7 5.6 35 3084 35.1 -7.3 75.8 -4.0 39 9008 -1400 10408
97 -2.1 2.4 1.2 0.5 0.7 1.5 4.3 10.4 45 7168 34.9 -6.1 88.4 -3.9 155 21305 9862 11623
98 -2.9 2.0 2.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -1.4 5.6 38 8876 41.5 -7.0 114.9  59 25738 7530 18208
99 -1.3 0.4 1.0 -0.7 0.1 0.2 0.6 4.4 35 15333 34.0 -3.8 97.8  46 49520 29696 19824
Slovak                           Bn Kr 
93 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 11 30.8 12.7 -4.8 96.3  23 40 -33 73
94 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.3 -0.5 1.2 8.2 3.3 12 32.0 14.6 4.9 97.3  13 49 -2 51
95 0.4 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.8 9.8 7.6 13 29.7 18.4 2.2 100.0  10 77 52 25
96 -2.1 2.3 0.3 0.0 2.0 0.4 2.0 13.1 11 30.7 19.7 -11.1 99.7 -1.4 6 83 62 21
97 -2.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 1.7 0.1 0.5 10.6 15 33.6 20.4 -10.1 104.6 -4.1 6 99 91 8
98 -2.1 1.9 0.4 0.8 0.7 -0.5 -2.3 8.1 18 35.2 21.3 -10.4 102.3 -4.2 7 94 65 29
99 -1.2 1.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 4.1 10.2 17 41.4 19.7 -6.1 99.3 -3.3 11 124 131 -7
Slovenia                             Bn  T 
93 0.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.8 -0.8 39 113 12.7 1.6 0.3 32 51 102 -51
94 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.9 0.7 29 129 14.4 4.2 -0.3 20 80 189 -109
95 -0.1 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.1 1.6 12 119 18.7 -0.5 -0.3 12 101 250 -149
96 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.6 -0.2 0.6 3.2 3.2 14 135 18.9 0.0 0.1 10 117 329 -212
97 0.0 1.2 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.3 7.2 7.2 10 160 18.2 0.0 -1.5 9 143 559 -416
98 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.2 1.0 1.5 7 166 19.5 -0.5 -0.6 9 172 594 -422
99 -0.7 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.5 2.9 7 182 20.7 -3.4 -0.8 7 208 629 -421
 
which I normalise by dividing by GDP. We are also interested in whether capital flows 
create problem of reserve inflows by creating a large balance of payments surplus. As in 
Table 1 I therefore highlight the episodes in which countries faced large inflows of capital or 
faced a large balance of payments surplus. 
Table 4 also records data on short-term interest rates, the real exchange rate, the budget 
surplus, CPI inflation, and the composition of the central bank balance sheet in which 
domestic currency is the liability and the corresponding net assets are decomposed into those 
demoninated in domestic currency NDA and those in foreign currency NFA. 
4.3. Can we Relate the Evolution of Capital Flows to the Choice of  
Exchange Rate Regime? 
Table 4 shows that most countries experienced sustained capital inflows during the 1990s. 
Even the two countries in which serious setbacks to transition occurred – Bulgarian and 
Romania – had substantially more inflows than outflows. 
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Some experiences are closely in line with what textbook reasoning would have led us to 
expect. Estonia and Lithuania adopted currency boards, and, after an initial period of floating, 
Latvia also opted for a tightly pegged exchange rate. Small countries have fewer illusions 
about their likely monetary sovereignty in the long run, and may be able to develop the 
political cohesion necessary to pursue responsible fiscal policies necessary to cope with the 
tough love that currency boards dispense. Successful transition raises money demand – both 
because inflation falls and because real growth takes root – requiring corresponding increases 
in money supply. In a currency board regime these come from running balance of payments 
surpluses.  
Moreover, since successful transition economies optimally should be financing some of 
their transition investment in foreign capital markets – thereby smoothing consumption over 
time for domestic residents – we expect currency board countries to display balance of 
payments surpluses, larger capital inflows, and small current account deficits. Table 4 
essentially confirms these predictions for the three Baltic countries. Even Bulgaria – which 
adopted a currency board as a last resort after transition stalled in 1997 – is now beginning to 
conform to this pattern. 
At the opposite extreme lie the countries that have always pursued flexible exchange rates, 
albeit with considerable intervention by the central bank. In this group I would place 
Slovenia, in which capital controls were retained longer than elsewhere, and probably the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Table 4 shows that both countries experience 
capital inflows, though on a smaller scale than in many other countries. By definition, reserve 
inflows through balance of payments surpluses should have been smaller in countries that 
were floating substantially. This is confirmed by Table 4, although the external payments 
position sometimes departed considerably from overall balance. This corroborates the claim 
that, even in countries ostensibly floating the exchange rate, there was in practice considerable 
exchange rate management. 
Romania too has essentially been floating, not least because most of its stabilization 
programmes have carried little credibility for long. Even so, Table 4 shows considerable, and 
sustained, inflows on the capital account. Floating was rarely sufficient to rule out capital 
inflows. However, when the authorities allow the exchange rate to find its own level, whether 
as deliberate policy or because they lack the means to do otherwise, we expect floating to 
limit the size of capital inflows because there is a limit to the size of offsetting current account 
deficits that markets are prepared to tolerate. Table 4 confirms that Romania’s payments were 
close to overall balance. In practice the current account never rose much beyond 7% of GDP. 
Capital inflows were almost always lower, making rare the double digit levels (as a % of 
GDP) experienced in the currency board Baltics, and in the Czech Republic during its period 
of a hard peg (whose collapse I discussed in Box 1). 
Table 4 shows Czech evidence that this abrupt move from a narrow exchange rate band to 
inflation targeting accompanied by a fairly free float is consistent with the claim that floating 
should reduce exposure to capital flows. However, before accepting too eagerly this easy 
conclusion, one should note that the evidence from Poland goes somewhat in the other 
direction. The great puzzle about Poland is why capital inflows were so low during the early 
years despite the fact that the establishment of a successful transition path in Poland seemed 
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evident from an early stage. As time elapsed, Poland moved from its sequence of exchange 
rate pegs to a more explicit policy of inflation targeting and greater exchange rate flexibility. 
Nevertheless, the scale of capital flows to Poland has steadily increased not diminished. Nor 
has a more flexible exchange rate prevented the Polish current account deficit rising to over 
8%, above the level experienced in the Czech Republic just prior to the 1997 attack on its 
exchange rate peg.  These conclusions apply a fortiori in Slovakia, where greater recent 
exchange rate flexibility in the Slovak Republic has been accompanies by very substantial 
capital inflows and  current account deficits in excess of 10% of GDP. 
The remaining country to review is Hungary, whose exchange rate regime is not easy to 
classify. In the first half of the decade, the frequent devaluations of its exchange rate peg gave 
a great deal of exchange rate flexibility in practice. However, the second half of the decade 
saw the adoption of preannounced crawling bands for exchange rate, with progressively 
slower rates of crawl, which significantly reduced exchange rate flexibility. At a time when 
other countries have followed the new conventional wisdom of rushing for the corners – very 
fixed or very flexible – Hungary has continued to inhabit successfully the dangerous middle 
ground.  One might have thought that this should increase its vulnerability to capital flows. 
Apart form 1999, Table 4 contains little evidence of such a trend. Begg and Wyplosz (2001a) 
argue that remaining capital controls may account for some of the explanation. Even if this is 
true, it is a shield likely soon to be abandoned if Hungary is to meet its aspirations for early 
EU entry. 
Summing up    
It would of course have been remarkable if the experience of all the European transition 
economies had conformed precisely to textbook predictions. Nevertheless, the preceding 
discussion found only a few surprises. Generally, more flexible exchange rates were 
associated with lower levels of capital flows. However, it would take a much more extensive 
structural investigation to justify the implied direction of causality, from exchange rate regime 
to magnitude of capital flows. Although my own judgement is that this conclusion is indeed 
warranted, there is probably also a measure of reverse causation – countries in more robust 
health, and therefore more attractive candidates for foreign investors, were the only ones 
capable of sustaining fixed exchange rates for any significant period of time. 
4.4. Sterilization of Capital Flows 
As in my discussion of Western Europe in section 3, one might expect central banks to have 
attempted to sterilize reserve inflows to prevent them showing up in the domestic money 
supply.  The evidence of such behavior, or its absence, is available in the last three columns of 
Table 4. Was an increase in central bank liabilities (domestic currency) accompanied by a 
balanced increase in both net domestic assets and net foreign assets of the central bank? Or 
did net foreign asset (NFA) growth vastly outstrip liability growth as domestic debt (negative 
NDA) was issued to sterilize the monetary consequences of reserve inflows? 
Except in Romania, the answer is pretty overwhelming – foreign reserves were stockpiled 
on a massive scale, financed by heavy issues of domestic debt that took net domestic assets 
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well into negative territory. This policy was pursued independently of the exchange rate 
regime. It is not therefore correct to argue that countries with more flexible exchange rates 
thereby avoided the perceived dilemma of how much to let reserve inflows show up in the 
domestic money supply. 
4.5. Did Exchange Rate Regimes Induce Differences in Fiscal Behaviour?  
Possibly, though again it would take much more extensive analysis to demonstrate this 
reliably. Clearly, there were some spectacular turnarounds, none more so that in Bulgaria in 
1997, when the acuteness of the crisis provoked both the adoption of a currency board and a 
massive fiscal tightening. Both have subsequently been sustained. But did the currency board 
provide the ammunition to keep fiscal policy tight, or was it the ability to keep fiscal policy 
tight that allowed the currency board then to survive? It is very hard to tell the difference. To 
a lesser extent the same is true of Hungary, where a crisis in mid decade prompted both a 
fiscal tightening and the adoption of a harder exchange rate path. 
However, more flexible exchange rate policies were not generally accompanied by looser 
fiscal policy. Fiscal policy was fairly tight throughout in the Czech Republic, despite a 
dramatic increase in exchange rate flexibility in 1997. Fiscal policy has been tight in Poland, 
where exchange rate flexibility also increased. It was tight in Slovenia, despite a much more 
flexible exchange rate policy, but also in the currency board countries in the Baltics.  
5. BACK TO THE FUTURE 
We are interested in links between exchange rate regimes and capital flow behavior not 
merely as a way of understanding the past but because accession countries will have to make 
a series of adjustments to their exchange rate regimes along the path by which they enter 
monetary union. There are three ways to form a judgement about how perilous this path will 
be and what policies can sensibly be adopted to make it more safe. 
5.1. Theory  
Economic theory continues to justify the claims (a) that fixed but adjustable exchange rates 
are vulnerable to capital flows and speculative attack when capital mobility is high (b) that 
sterilized intervention is unlikely to be of much use in such circumstances (c) that the ability 
to tighten fiscal policy further is a useful safety valve, and (d) that credibility is not the 
attribute of a unidimensional policy but a characteristic of the policy package as a whole. 
From such a standpoint, rapid, even unilateral adoption of the Euro might be the safest 
option for many of the countries in the early waves of accession. However, this will not be an 
option. The internal politics of the EU requires that future members have to suffer the same 
initiation rights that were forced upon the founder members. As with most initiation rights, 
one can say either that they are the only sure way to find out if prospective members are 
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serious and willing members of the club, or that they are totally unnecessary. To the extent 
that the structural and political aspirations of accession countries are endogenous, one might 
take the latter view: membership itself will suffice to bring about the changes required. 
There is of course a subtle difference between the difficulties that confronted in the Treaties 
of Maastricht and Amsterdam, and those confronted in the treaty of Nice. For founder 
members of EMU, it was necessary to ensure that EMU got off to as good a start as possible; 
it was also necessary politically to induce Germany to give up its secure position as leading 
policy maker within the ERM in exchange for a more uncertain prospect within EMU. 
However, once the traditions of EMU have already been successfully established, it is much 
less clear that additional new members need to be subject to quite such vigorous scrutiny. The 
insistence on doing so is therefore based not on what makes sense in this particular instance 
taken in isolation.  
Rather it reflects the desire to preserve the EU principle that new members are always 
subject to the same rules as old members. To do otherwise would risk reopening discussion of 
every set of EU rules. However, EU entry by the current accession countries will inevitably 
entail discriminatory treatment on the Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds – otherwise 
the EU budget will not be able to afford them – so the principle is to be abandoned anyway. It 
is far from clear that it should therefore be defended in relation to the Maastricht criteria in 
general, and in particular to the requirement to spend two years languishing in the vulnerable 
half way house of the ERM. 
5.2. Lessons from the Founder Members’ Experience in Convergence to EMU  
Theoretical reasoning has highlighted the potential danger of the period in which capital 
controls are abandoned, exchange rate flexibility is curtailed, but the Euro is not yet adopted. 
However, the experience of EMU members themselves yields some surprises that are a cause 
for optimism. 
First, the greatest capital inflows that they experienced were generally when stabilization 
first occurred, well before the years immediately prior to EMU, and often when some measure 
of exchange rate flexibility remained. It is therefore possible that the scale of capital flows 
will not simply rise and rise in Central and Eastern Europe as the dates of EU accession and 
EMU entry draw closer. 
Second, and related, the famous convergence plays on interest rates did not generally lead 
to massive reserve inflows. They were offset by other items on the capital account or current 
account. No wave of (potentially temporary) foreign money was allowed in.   
Third, in Ireland, the recipient of the largest sustained capital flows, substantial fiscal 
tightening after the mid 1980s was sufficient to induce a substantial increase in 
competitiveness despite membership of the New EMS in which realignments to place only 
during the crisis of 1992.   
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Since the fiscal elements of the Maastricht criteria will put further downward pressure on 
fiscal policies that Table 4 shows were generally quite tight in Central and Eastern Europe, 
there is every prospect that competitiveness can remain intact along the transition to 
accession. 
5.3. Lessons from the 1990s Experience of Transition Countries Themselves 
Cosmetic changes in the exchange rate regime alone have generally proved of little benefit. 
However, where such changes have been part of a comprehensive policy change – as in 
Bulgaria in 1997, the Czech Republic in 1997 or Hungary in 1995 – the package has usually 
succeeded in improving subsequent performance. Unless one takes the view that fiscal and 
other improvements were achieved only because of the change in exchange rate regime, it is 
incorrect to attribute all the subsequent success to the exchange rate regime alone. Rather, a 
clear appreciation of the ways different policies interact is essential for the design of sound 
policy packages and the credibility these packages then develop. 
Nothing in the experience of European transition economies in the 1990s overturns the 
lessons drawn the experience of Western Europe. Sterilization is of little lasting benefit. It 
may have some effects when capital controls are in place, but should not be expected to have 
a major impact since all accession countries are committed to the early and full removal of 
capital account controls. Similarly, when transition economies were able to run a prudent 
fiscal policy, generally other aspects of their policy design and economic performance were 
more easily accomplished. 
European transition economies have experienced a wide range of exchange rate regimes, 
and will therefore approach accession negotiations form very different standpoints. The 
European Commission already accepts two useful principles. First, that individual countries 
will have discretion about the time that elapses between EU membership and the subsequent 
entry to the ERM as a 2-year stepping stone to EMU. Second, such ERM membership may be 
consistent with a range of exchange rate arrangements. What really matters is the ‘no 
devaluation of the central parity for two years’. This is consistent with a currency board 
(provided existing calibrations to the US dollar are altered to a parity against the Euro), or the 
maintenance of a central parity with a wide band (plus or minus 15%) which would not differ 
so very much from most of the managed floats currently in existence.  
It would however be incompatible with the current ‘preannounced evolving parity’ that 
characterized the Hungarian crawl. As with the prohibition of instant and unilateral adoption 
of the Euro by accession countries, this prohibition is hard to defend except by the argument 
that new members must undergo exactly the same path as their predecessors.  
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